The Religious Openness Hypothesis argues that traditional religions have resources for integrating intellect with faith. In a test of this hypothesis, Hindu graduate students in India responded to Hindu religious reflection, attitudes toward Hinduism, religious schema, religious orientation, and psychological openness scales. Faith and intellect oriented religious reflection correlated positively with each other and with the all three religious schemas, which also correlated directly. Linkages with attitudes toward Hinduism and intrinsic and extrinsic personal religious orientations documented the compatibility of religious (...) reflection and schema with Hindu commitments. Associations with greater openness to experience and need for cognition confirmed their psychological openness as well. Interactions between attitudes toward Hinduism and the intrinsic orientation suggested that Hinduism had more positive influences in those who were more sincerely religious. These data from India most importantly supported the Religious Openness Hypothesis. (shrink)

Many recent evolutionary psychology and human behavioral ecology studies have tested hypotheses by examining correlations between variables measured at a group level (e.g., state, country, continent). In such analyses, variables collected for each aggregation are often taken to be representative of the individuals present within them, and relationships between such variables are presumed to reflect individual-level processes. There are multiple reasons to exercise caution when doing so, including: (1) the ecological fallacy, whereby relationships observed at the aggregate level do not (...) accurately represent individual-level processes; (2) non-independence of data points, which violates assumptions of the inferential techniques used in null hypothesis testing; and (3) cross-cultural non-equivalence of measurement (differences in construct validity between groups). We provide examples of how each of these gives rise to problems in the context of testing evolutionary hypotheses about human behavior, and we offer some suggestions for future research. (shrink)

The Affordable Care Act1 promises to improve access to coverage and care for two vulnerable groups: low-income persons who are excluded by a lack of resources and chronically ill and disabled people who are excluded by the dysfunction of our existing insurance and care delivery systems. ACA’s sprawling provisions raise a wealth of implementation challenges that are exacerbated by the compromises required to move reform through Congress. In particular, the compromise between regulatory/public program advocates and advocates for private, market-driven programs (...) requires thoughtful regulatory coordination between public and private health systems. (shrink)

The Affordable Care Act1 promises to improve access to coverage and care for two vulnerable groups: low-income persons who are excluded by a lack of resources and chronically ill and disabled people who are excluded by the dysfunction of our existing insurance and care delivery systems. ACA’s sprawling provisions raise a wealth of implementation challenges that are exacerbated by the compromises required to move reform through Congress. In particular, the compromise between regulatory/public program advocates and advocates for private, market-driven programs (...) requires thoughtful regulatory coordination between public and private health systems. (shrink)

The current rise in malpractice litigation has led to concern in the research community as to the prospect of litigation against researchers. Clearly as the responsibility for the day-to-day conduct of the research falls upon the researchers they will be potentially liable should there be negligence in the conduct of the research project itself. But to what extent can the research ethics committee and its members be held liable should harm result to the research subject? How far does the prospect (...) of the threat of litigation equate with the reality of the prospect of liability? Although the NHS research governance framework suggests that primary responsibility for the conduct of the trial is with the researcher this does not mean that REC members will be immune from actions in tort where research subjects suffer harm in the conduct of a research project approved by their NHS REC. This paper focuses upon the prospect for liability in the law of tort of NHS RECs and their members. While in practice the vast majority of such claims are unlikely to be successful members of RECs may incur resultant legal costs as a consequence of involvement in proposed litigation. It is submitted that the scope of indemnity provision provided to RECs and their members should be precisely determined, otherwise there is a real prospect that the risk of malpractice litigation may deter individuals from serving on such committees. (shrink)

This completes what I think one may state and defend on physical grounds concerning the foundations of Astrology and the coming year 1602. If those learned in matters of Physics think them worthy of consideration, and communicate to me their objections to them, for the sake of eliciting the truth, I shall, if God grants me the skill, reply to them in my prognostication for the following year. I urge all who make a serious study of philosophy to engage in (...) this contest. For it concerns our worship of God and the welfare of the human race. Meanwhile, I pray from the depths of my soul, through Christ our mediator, that for all and for each the coming year may be a very happy one. (shrink)

The aim of this investigation is to discuss the merits of the three radically divergent views as to the nature and function of the categories held by Kant, Ward and Alexander.

In Cratylus 385 b-c Plato argues that if statements () can be true or false, names (),2 as parts () of statements, are also capable of being true or false. From Aristotle onwards this view has often been challenged,3 and R. Robinson put the case against it trenchantly when he wrote:4 This argument is bad; for names have no truth-value, and the reason given for saying that they do is a fallacy of division. No one in the dialogue points out (...) that it is bad. … Nevertheless it is fairly probable that Plato saw or at least felt that it is a bad argument, quite different in quality from those he later produces against the nature-theory. (shrink)

In Cratylus 385 b-c Plato argues that if statements () can be true or false, names (),2 as parts () of statements, are also capable of being true or false. From Aristotle onwards this view has often been challenged,3 and R. Robinson put the case against it trenchantly when he wrote:4This argument is bad; for names have no truth-value, and the reason given for saying that they do is a fallacy of division. No one in the dialogue points out that (...) it is bad. … Nevertheless it is fairly probable that Plato saw or at least felt that it is a bad argument, quite different in quality from those he later produces against the nature-theory. (shrink)